AUDITA'S VULNERABILITY HIGHLIGHTS

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Front Running Attack Upon Fee Change


Part 6: Front Running attack upon fee change

Imagine a scenario in which the fee value of a DEX, or a specific pool is hardcoded to 0 in the constructor. 

Somewhere down the line, this fee amount might need to be changed. This happens by calling the set function after deployment to configure the fees. 

However, in such a case, an attacker can front-run the set call and invoke deposit before that —  without paying the appropriate fee.

How to fix and prevent this attack? 

➡️ Allow for fees to be defined in the constructor.

Follow and ReX @AuditaSecurity on X and LinkedIn for safety tips, hack alerts and all things Web3.

Stay safu!
Audita's Team

AUDITA'S VULNERABILITY HIGHLIGHTS

Blog Article Cover Image


Front Running Attack Upon Fee Change


Part 6: Front Running attack upon fee change

Imagine a scenario in which the fee value of a DEX, or a specific pool is hardcoded to 0 in the constructor. 

Somewhere down the line, this fee amount might need to be changed. This happens by calling the set function after deployment to configure the fees. 

However, in such a case, an attacker can front-run the set call and invoke deposit before that —  without paying the appropriate fee.

How to fix and prevent this attack? 

➡️ Allow for fees to be defined in the constructor.

Follow and ReX @AuditaSecurity on X and LinkedIn for safety tips, hack alerts and all things Web3.

Stay safu!
Audita's Team

AUDITA'S VULNERABILITY HIGHLIGHTS

Blog Article Cover Image


Front Running Attack Upon Fee Change


Part 6: Front Running attack upon fee change

Imagine a scenario in which the fee value of a DEX, or a specific pool is hardcoded to 0 in the constructor. 

Somewhere down the line, this fee amount might need to be changed. This happens by calling the set function after deployment to configure the fees. 

However, in such a case, an attacker can front-run the set call and invoke deposit before that —  without paying the appropriate fee.

How to fix and prevent this attack? 

➡️ Allow for fees to be defined in the constructor.

Follow and ReX @AuditaSecurity on X and LinkedIn for safety tips, hack alerts and all things Web3.

Stay safu!
Audita's Team

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